Cases

Martland v HMRC: The Three-Stage Late Appeal Test

Every late tax appeal is judged against the Martland three-stage test. Here's the full story—and what it means if you've missed your deadline.

Liam Williams

Liam Williams

— 11 min read

You missed the deadline. HMRC sent a decision and you had 30 days to appeal. That deadline has passed. Maybe by weeks, maybe by months, maybe by years. What happens now?

Since 2018, every late appeal application in the UK tax tribunals has been judged against a three-stage test established in Martland v HMRC. In July 2025, a High Court judge declared the test "clearly wrong." In January 2026, the Court of Appeal unanimously disagreed and confirmed it is here to stay. This is the story of that test, and what it means for your late appeal.

For the step-by-step process of filing a late appeal, see our late appeals guide.

What This Case Was About

William Martland was a lorry driver. In December 2013, he was stopped at the UK border driving a vehicle loaded with mixed beer. The importation was flagged as suspicious—the Administrative Reference Code had already been used on a previous load. Both the beer and the vehicle were seized.

Mr Martland said he had been engaged by a haulage company to drive the load. He was paid cash in hand and had no paperwork.

HMRC assessed him for excise duty of £24,694 and a wrongdoing penalty of £9,507. He had 30 days to appeal. He didn't make it. His solicitors couldn't act without funds, and the letter of authority didn't arrive for over a year. By the time his appeal reached the tribunal, he was approximately 15 months late.

The First-tier Tribunal (FTT) refused his late appeal. He appealed to the Upper Tribunal (UT). His solicitors then dropped him less than a month before the hearing. He didn't attend and wasn't represented. He submitted short written representations saying he couldn't afford a lawyer.

The UT dismissed his appeal. But in doing so, it set out the definitive framework for every late appeal that followed. Mr Martland lost his case—but his name is now on the test that governs yours.

The Three-Stage Test

At paragraph [44] of Martland v HMRC [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC), the UT established a three-stage process drawn from Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906, a Court of Appeal decision on relief from sanctions in civil proceedings:

Stage 1: How Long Were You Late?

The tribunal first establishes the length of the delay. If the delay is very short—days rather than weeks—then the tribunal "is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third stages." But this does not mean short delays are automatically forgiven. Even a delay of about 60 days has been held serious enough to require full analysis (see Cranham Sports below).

Stage 2: Why Were You Late?

The tribunal then establishes the reason or reasons for the delay. This is where you explain what happened. Were you ill? Did your adviser fail to file? Did you not understand the deadline? The tribunal isn't looking for a perfect excuse—but it needs to understand why the default occurred.

Stage 3: Balancing All The Circumstances

The tribunal then conducts a balancing exercise, weighing the merits of the reason for the delay against the prejudice to both parties if permission is granted or refused. That means weighing up everything: how strong your excuse is, how long the delay was, what's at stake for you, and what it would mean for HMRC and the tribunal system if your late appeal were allowed.

The starting point is against you. As the UT put it: "permission should not be granted unless the FTT is satisfied on balance that it should be." You are asking for an exception to a rule, and the burden is on you to justify it.

The Deep Principles

The three stages are simple to state. The principles behind them are what make late appeals so hard to win.

The "Particular Importance" Direction

At paragraph [45], the UT added 31 words that became the most consequential part of the judgment:

"That balancing exercise should take into account the particular importance of the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected."

This direction imported language from CPR 3.9—a rule governing civil court proceedings—into the entirely different context of statutory appeal deadlines. It means that when the tribunal weighs up everything at stage 3, two factors carry extra weight: keeping the system efficient, and respecting time limits.

In practice, this creates a strong presumption against late appeals. The clock is not just a guideline—it is a boundary the tribunal takes seriously.

Being Unrepresented Is Not An Excuse

At paragraph [47], the UT addressed the argument that litigants in person (people representing themselves without a lawyer) should be given more leeway with deadlines. It disagreed. HMRC's appealable decisions "generally include a statement of the relevant appeal rights in reasonably plain English and it is not a complicated process to notify an appeal to the FTT, even for a litigant in person."

The same paragraph held that shortage of funds—the very reason Mr Martland was late—"should not, of itself, generally carry any weight."

This is direct and uncomfortable. The tribunal recognises that many appellants cannot afford legal help. But it will not accept that fact alone as a reason for missing the deadline.

Your HMRC decision letter tells you how to appeal and when. Filing costs £0. The tribunal expects you to act within the time limit regardless of whether you have a lawyer.

The Merits Of Your Case Matter—But Only At The Margins

At paragraph [46], the UT said the tribunal "can have regard to any obvious strength or weakness of the applicant's case"—but "this should not descend into a detailed analysis of the underlying merits of the appeal."

The logic is about prejudice. There is obviously much greater prejudice for an applicant to lose the opportunity of putting forward a really strong case than a very weak one. But the tribunal won't conduct a mini-trial at the permission stage. Only where the case is obviously very strong or very weak will the merits play a significant role.

This means your grounds of appeal still matter at the late appeal stage—but as supporting evidence, not as the main event.

The Katib Rule: When Your Adviser Fails

What if you missed the deadline because your accountant or solicitor failed you? HMRC v Katib [2019] UKUT 189 (TCC) answered that question—and the answer is not what most people expect.

Mr Katib was the director of a metal trading company. HMRC issued personal liability notices totalling approximately £490,000. He retained a professional adviser, Mr Bridger of Sovereign Associates, who the FTT described as a "fabulist." Mr Bridger's advice included telling Mr Katib to "cease to be a man by making a declaration to that effect" so that Mr Bridger could tell HMRC his client was dead.

The FTT allowed Mr Katib's late appeal, finding this adviser behaviour was so extraordinary it went beyond normal incompetence. The UT reversed that decision. At paragraphs [54]-[56], the UT established a clear rule:

"It is precisely because of the importance of complying with statutory time limits that, when considering applications for permission to make a late appeal, failures by a litigant's adviser should generally be treated as failures by the litigant."

The reasoning is practical. If the adviser fails, it is better that the client bear the consequences than the other party. The client has a potential remedy in damages against the adviser. And allowing adviser incompetence as a routine exception would become, in the words of the Court of Appeal in Hytec Information Systems v Coventry City Council, "a charter for the incompetent."

The UT acknowledged that exceptions are "possible"—but even Mr Bridger's extraordinary fabrication did not qualify. The message is stark: if your adviser missed your deadline, the tribunal will treat it as if you missed it yourself.

The Medpro Saga

For seven years, the Martland test was applied without serious challenge. Then came Medpro.

The Challenge (July 2025)

Medpro Healthcare Ltd v HMRC [2025] UKUT 255 (TCC) involved Mr Kalvinder Ruprai, a company director facing assessments and penalties exceeding £1 million. He had been seriously ill and had instructed a professional adviser who admitted that one missed deadline was simply "an oversight." The FTT applied Martland and Katib mechanically, refusing all three late appeals without conducting any meaningful balancing exercise at stage 3.

Both UT judges agreed the FTT's decision was wrong. Both agreed the three-stage structure at paragraph [44] of Martland was "unimpeachable." But they split on paragraph [45]—the "particular importance" direction.

Marcus Smith J held that importing the CPR 3.9 weighting into a statutory discretion was "clearly wrong." The statute gives the tribunal an unfettered discretion to admit late appeals. Unlike CPR 3.9, it contains no direction about what factors should carry extra weight. Imposing one through binding guidance effectively fetters the discretion Parliament intended to be free.

Judge Cannan dissented, arguing the UT was entitled to draw the analogy and that judicial comity required following previous UT decisions.

Marcus Smith J had the casting vote. For a brief period, the "particular importance" direction was gone.

The Court Of Appeal Restoration (January 2026)

HMRC appealed. In HMRC v Medpro Healthcare Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 14, the Court of Appeal—Lord Justice Lewison, Lady Justice Whipple, and Lord Justice Miles—unanimously reversed Marcus Smith J and restored the Martland guidance.

The Court held that the UT is entitled to give structured guidance to the FTT on how to exercise statutory discretions. This is "an important function" of the UT, promoting consistency across panels. The fact that the statute is unfettered does not prevent a superior tribunal from directing how the discretion should normally be exercised.

At paragraph [57], the Court concluded that "the UT in this case was correct in deciding that the Martland guidance, as amplified in Katib, was entirely appropriate."

The Court added three important qualifications at paragraph [45]. First, guidance is just that—guidance. The FTT may depart from it if it gives sound reasons. Second, guidance is appropriate even where a discretion appears unfettered. Third, the Supreme Court in BPP Holdings v HMRC [2017] UKSC 55 specifically approved giving guidance on time limit compliance.

What The Saga Proved

Perhaps the most telling detail is what happened during the uncertainty. In Pawar v HMRC [2025] UKUT 309 (TCC), the UT applied the relaxed Medpro approach—without the "particular importance" weighting—and still refused a late appeal involving a 38-month delay. In Ram v HMRC [2026] UKFTT 249 (TC), the FTT said that applying the less strict approach "would have made no difference whatsoever."

The practical factors—how long the delay was, how good the reasons were, how strong the underlying case was—mattered more than the legal weighting. Whether or not the tribunal was directed to give "particular importance" to time limits, it was going to respect them anyway. The Medpro saga confirmed that the Martland framework reflects how tribunals actually think about late appeals, not just how they are told to.

What The Case Law Shows

The pattern across the cases is consistent—and sobering. Late appeals are refused far more often than they are allowed.

~60 days late: In Cranham Sports LLP v HMRC [2024] UKUT 209 (TCC), the delay was approximately 60 days—about twice the length of the original deadline. The representative made a bona fide mistake. The FTT held the delay was serious enough to require full consideration of the second and third Martland stages. Permission refused.

15 months late: Martland itself. Mr Martland couldn't afford a lawyer. The FTT called it "clearly a significant and serious delay." Permission refused.

70 days to 5+ months late: In Medpro, the delays ranged from 70 days to over 5 months. The appellant was seriously ill and his adviser admitted oversight. The FTT refused all three applications (though the UT sent the case back for a proper stage 3 analysis).

38 months late: In Pawar, the delay was over three years on a personal liability notice for £874,238. Even applying the relaxed Medpro UT test, the UT refused permission. The unjustified delay outweighed everything else.

4-5+ years late: In Fender v HMRC [2026] UKFTT 319 (TC)—the first published FTT decision to explicitly apply Martland as confirmed by the Court of Appeal—the delays were over four and over five years on closure notices. Permission refused.

8+ years late: In Panesar v HMRC [2024] UKFTT 412 (TC), the appellant was over 8 years late and claimed HMRC had lost his online submission. Permission refused.

Late appeals are not impossible—short delays with compelling, evidenced reasons and strong underlying cases do succeed. But the pattern is clear. Once the delay is measured in months rather than days, and the reason is anything other than exceptional, the odds are heavily against you.

What This Means For Your Late Appeal

If you've missed your 30 days deadline, here is how the Martland framework shapes your position. For the mechanics of how to file, see our late appeals guide. This section is about how to think about your application.

  1. The starting point is against you—lead with your strongest reason. The tribunal begins from the position that permission should not be granted. Your application needs to give the tribunal a reason to make an exception. Don't bury the explanation for your delay at the end of a long submission. Put your best reason up front, with evidence.

  2. If your adviser failed, you bear it—show what you did once you found out. Under the Katib rule, your adviser's failure is treated as yours. If you discovered the failure and acted within days, say so. The speed of your response once you became aware of the problem is one of the few things that can help at stage 3. The client's remedy against the negligent adviser is in damages—a separate matter entirely.

  3. Show the merits of your underlying case. The tribunal won't conduct a mini-trial, but obvious strength helps. If your case has a clear legal argument or HMRC's position has an evident weakness, explain it briefly. Strong grounds of appeal improve your late appeal prospects.

  4. Act now—every day of additional delay is stage 1 evidence against you. The clock doesn't stop running because you're thinking about what to do. Every additional day adds to the delay the tribunal assesses at stage 1. File your late appeal application as soon as you can.

  5. For direct taxes, try HMRC first. Under section 49 TMA 1970, you can ask HMRC to accept a late appeal before going to the tribunal. HMRC must be satisfied you had a reasonable excuse for missing the deadline and that you acted without unreasonable delay after the excuse ended. If HMRC accepts, you avoid the tribunal application entirely. For indirect taxes (VAT, excise), this route is not available—only the tribunal can admit a late appeal.

  6. Filing costs £0. There is no fee to file. The financial barrier is the cost of the delay itself, not the cost of applying. If you have missed the deadline after an HMRC internal review, you have a fresh 30 days from the date of the review conclusion letter—check whether that deadline has also passed.

If the tribunal refuses your late appeal application, that decision can itself be appealed to the Upper Tribunal—but only on a point of law, and the costs regime is stricter. See our guide on what happens after a tribunal decision for that route.

The Judgment And Key Sources

The judgment:

The Medpro saga:

Other cases discussed:

Legislation:

On this site:

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal or tax advice. For advice specific to your situation, consult a qualified tax adviser, accountant, or solicitor.

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